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VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
This appeal concerns whether Appellant PNC Financial Services Group, Inc. 
(“PNC”) is entitled to insurance coverage for amounts it paid to resolve several class 
action lawsuits.  Specifically at issue is whether $102 million that PNC paid pursuant to 
two settlement agreements is covered under PNC’s insurance policy with its excess 
insurer, Appellee Axis Insurance Company (“Axis”).  On cross motions for judgment on 
the pleadings, the District Court concluded that the majority of the settlement payments 
were excluded from coverage under the policy’s “Professional Services Charge 
Exception” because the payments constituted a refund of overdraft fees paid by PNC’s 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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customers.  The District Court also held, however, that approximately $30 million of the 
$102 million, which was awarded to class counsel as attorneys’ fees and costs, was 
recoverable under the policy as covered “Damages” that did not fall within the 
Professional Services Charge Exception.  PNC appealed and Axis filed a cross-appeal.  
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the entire $102 million is excluded from 
coverage under the Professional Services Charge Exception.  Accordingly, we will affirm 
in part and reverse in part.  
I.  
We write primarily for the parties, who are intimately familiar with the facts of 
this case.  Accordingly, we recount only those facts that are pertinent to our resolution of 
the issues presented. 
Six class action lawsuits were filed against PNC and National City Bank1  
regarding the manner in which the banks processed debit card and ATM transactions in 
order to maximize fees for overdrafts.  Four of the actions were consolidated in the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida as part of a multi-district 
action (the “MDL” action), the fifth was filed in the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia (the “Trombley” action), and the sixth was filed in the Court of 
Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania (the “Henry” action).   
The class actions presented three main contentions.  First, the actions asserted that 
when a customer uses a debit card, the bank is immediately able to determine whether 
there are sufficient funds in the customer’s account to cover the attempted transaction.  
                                              
1 PNC acquired National City Bank in 2008.  
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The banks then have the option to accept or decline the transaction and have the 
technological capability to notify the customer that the transaction will result in an 
overdraft of funds if they proceed.  Rather than notifying the customer or declining the 
transaction—which the bank did if the pending transaction would exceed a pre-
determined tolerance limit for an account—the banks implemented an automated, fee-
based overdraft program that processed the transactions and charged its customers 
overdraft fees.  Second, the suits alleged that the banks manipulated the order in which 
they processed transactions—by processing them in the order of largest to smallest, 
instead of chronologically—in order to maximize the fees that a customer paid.  Finally, 
the suits contended that the banks failed to adequately disclose to its customers that they 
could opt out of this policy and avoid overdrafts and fees altogether.     
PNC reached agreements to settle the Trombley and MDL actions in December 
2010 and December 2012, respectively.  The Trombley settlement agreement provided 
for a fund of $12 million to “refund” overdraft fees incurred over any selected two-month 
period.  (J.A. 693.)  The MDL settlement agreement provided for a fund of $90 million to 
reimburse, on a pro rata basis, customers who were charged two or more overdraft fees 
on the same day and customers who had a “Positive Differential Overdraft Fee.”2  (J.A. 
833, 838.)  
                                              
2 A “Positive Differential Overdraft Fee” is determined by calculating the 
difference between the amount of overdraft fees PNC charged using high-to-low posting 
and the amount of overdraft fees PNC would have charged without using this method, 
less the total amount of refunds the customer already received.  If the resulting number is 
positive, then the customer has a “Positive Differential Overdraft Fee.”  For example, 
assume PNC charged a customer ten overdraft fees using high-to-low posting.  If the 
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On December 1, 2011, the District Court for the District of Columbia approved the 
Trombley settlement agreement.  In approving the settlement, the District Court directed 
that approximately $3 million of the $12 million fund be paid to class counsel as 
attorneys’ fees and costs.  On August 5, 2013, the District Court for the Southern District 
of Florida approved the MDL settlement agreement.  In approving the MDL settlement, 
the District Court directed that approximately $27 million of the $90 million settlement 
fund be paid to class counsel as attorneys’ fees and costs.  Importantly, the agreements 
did not provide that PNC would pay a set amount to settle the class claims and separately 
pay class counsel attorneys’ fees and costs once the District Court awarded them.3  
Rather, the approximately $30 million in attorneys’ fees and costs was to be paid out of 
the settlement funds.  Thereafter, a stipulation was entered in the Henry action that 
acknowledged that the MDL settlement agreements resolved the claims of the class 
members.    
Following the settlements, PNC sought indemnification from its insurers.  Under 
PNC’s liability insurance program, the first $25 million was self-insured, followed by a 
                                                                                                                                                  
customer would have only been charged five overdraft fees had PNC not used high-to-
low posting and PNC had not previously reimbursed the customer for any of the ten 
overdraft fees it charged, the customer would have a “Positive Differential Overdraft 
Fee” value of five (10-5-0=5). 
 
3 Notably, the agreements did provide for such an arrangement with respect to 
notice and claims administration costs.  In the Trombley settlement agreement, the parties 
agreed that, in addition to the $12 million fund, PNC would pay $1.8 million for notice 
and claims administration costs, with any costs in excess of the $1.8 million to be paid 
from the settlement fund.  (J.A. 751–52.)  In the MDL settlement agreement, the parties 
agreed that, in addition to the $90 million fund, PNC would pay “all costs and fees 
associated with Class Notice and Settlement Administration.”  (J.A. 1160.) 
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$25 million liability policy issued by Houston Casualty Company (“HCC”).  For claims 
exceeding the first $50 million, PNC retained a $25 million excess insurance policy 
issued by Axis.   
The policies with both HCC and Axis cover “all Loss for which the Insured 
becomes legally obligated to pay on account of any Claim first made against the 
Insured.”  (J.A. 113.)  “Loss” is defined as “Claims Expenses and Damages.”4  (J.A. 
116.)  In turn, “Damages” is defined as “a judgment, award, surcharge or settlement . . . 
and any award of pre- and post-judgment interest, attorneys’ fees and costs.”  (J.A. 115.)  
There are, however, several exceptions to the general definition of Damages, one of 
which is that Damages do not include “fees, commissions or charges for Professional 
Services paid or payable to an Insured” (referred to herein as the “Professional Services 
Charge Exception” and referred to in the District Court opinions as the “Fee Exception”).  
(J.A. 115.)  HCC and Axis denied coverage, contending that the settlement payments 
represented a refund of overdraft fees that customers had previously paid to PNC and 
National City Bank for Professional Services and, therefore, fell within the Professional 
Services Charge Exception to Damages.  
  In light of the insurers’ denial of coverage, PNC filed a declaratory judgment and 
breach of contract action in the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania.  The case was referred to a Magistrate Judge, who addressed the parties’ 
cross motions for judgment on the pleadings.  The motions raised two legal issues central 
                                              
4 The policies define “Claims Expenses” as “reasonable legal fees and expenses 
incurred in the defense or investigation of any Claim.”  (J.A. 114.) 
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to the dispute: (1) whether the amounts sought by PNC constitute “Loss” or “Damages” 
as defined by the policies; and (2) whether it would be contrary to Pennsylvania public 
policy to provide coverage for the amounts PNC paid in connection with the settlement 
agreements.   
On May 21, 2014, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation in 
which she concluded that the settlement payments constituted Damages and Loss under 
the policies because the Professional Services Charge Exception only applied to first-
party losses.  According to the Magistrate Judge, interpreting the Professional Services 
Charge Exception “to apply to third-party claims for improperly assessed fees . . . would 
render coverage under the financial institution liability policy illusory” and make 
“superfluous” the policy’s Personal Profit Exclusion (“PPE”).5  (J.A. 27.)  Additionally, 
the Magistrate Judge held that it was not contrary to Pennsylvania public policy to 
provide coverage for the settlement payments.  Therefore, the Magistrate Judge found 
that the $102 million in payments were covered under the terms of the policies. 
                                              
5 The PPE provides:  
 
The Underwriter shall not be liable to make any payment for 
Loss on account of a Claim: 
. . . . 
(C) brought about or contributed to in fact by any:  
. . . . 
(2) profit or remuneration gained by any Insured to which 
such Insured is not legally entitled; 
as determined by a final adjudication in the underlying 
action[.]  




The District Court disagreed, concluding that “given the nature of the policy and 
the language of the Damages definition, the exceptions must be read to apply to ‘third 
party’ losses.”  (J.A. 36.)  Because the settlement payments constituted a refund of fees 
that customers paid to PNC and National City Bank for Professional Services, the District 
Court held that “those portions being paid towards the individual class members” were 
excluded from coverage under the Professional Services Charge Exception.  (J.A. 36–37.)  
The District Court also concluded, however, that the amounts awarded to class counsel 
for attorneys’ fees and costs did not fall within the Professional Services Charge 
Exception.  Instead, the amounts fell within the definition of Damages as an “award of 
. . . attorneys’ fees and costs,” (J.A. 115), and were thus covered under the policies. (J.A. 
39–40.)   
The District Court then directed the parties to file a joint stipulation, consistent 
with its ruling, in order to determine the total amount of Loss PNC suffered under the 
policies.  Following the District Court's loss determination, PNC timely filed this appeal 
directed at the District Court's holding that the settlement payments were excluded from 
coverage under the Professional Services Charge Exception, and the insurers filed a 
cross-appeal challenging the District Court’s holding that the amounts awarded by the 
Trombley and MDL district courts for attorneys' fees and costs were covered Damages 
under the policies.6 
II.  
                                              
6 HCC and PNC stipulated to the dismissal of PNC’s appeal as to HCC and HCC’s 
cross-appeal, leaving Axis as the only remaining Appellee and Cross-Appellant.  
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The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).  We have 
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “We exercise plenary review over the 
District Court’s grant of [a] motion for judgment on the pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(c).”  Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Squires, 667 F.3d 388, 390 (3d Cir. 2012).  We 
look to the underlying allegations, as well as to the Settlement Agreements that PNC 
attached to its own Rule 12(c) motion, to determine whether the Trombley and MDL 
Settlement payments fall within or outside of the policy coverage.  See Spruill v. Gillis, 
372 F.3d 218, 223 & n.2 (3d Cir. 2004) (court may consider undisputedly authentic 
documents upon which the complaint is based that are attached to a Rule 12(c) motion); 
Fid. Bank v. Chartis Specialty Ins. Co., No. 12-4259, 2013 WL 4039414, at *3 (N.D. Ga. 
Aug. 7, 2013) (reviewing underlying allegations and concluding that settlement required 
bank “to return its customers’ funds”). 
A.  
This case involves interpretation of an insurance policy, and the determination of   
“the existence or non-existence of coverage is generally performed by the court.”  
Gardner v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 544 F.3d 553, 558 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting 
Donegal Mut. Ins. Co. v. Baumhammers, 938 A.2d 286, 290 (Pa. 2007)).7  A court’s 
“primary goal in interpreting a policy . . . is to ascertain the parties’ intentions as 
manifested by the policy’s terms.”  Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sweeney, 689 F.3d 288, 293 
(3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Kvaerner Metals Div. of Kvaerner U.S., Inc. v. Commercial 
                                              
7 Both parties agree that Pennsylvania law governs the interpretation of the 
insurance policy at issue.  
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Union Ins. Co., 908 A.2d 888, 897 (Pa. 2006)).  Where “the language of the contract is 
clear and unambiguous, a court is required to give effect to that language.”  Id. (quoting 
Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. Am. Empire Ins. Co., 469 A.2d 563, 566 (Pa. 1983)).  If a 
provision of a policy is ambiguous, however, courts generally construe the provision “in 
favor of the insured and against the insurer, the drafter of the agreement.”  Gardner, 544 
F.3d at 558 (quoting Standard Venetian Blind Co., 469 A.2d at 566).  But see E. 
Associated Coal Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 632 F.2d 1068, 1075 (3d Cir. 1980) 
(applying Pennsylvania law) (stating that the principle of construing ambiguous 
provisions in favor of insured “does not control the situation where large corporations, 
advised by counsel and having equal bargaining power, are the parties to a negotiated 
policy.”).  Although “[t]he burden is on the insured to establish coverage under an 
insurance policy,” the insurer “bears the burden of establishing the applicability of an 
exclusion . . . [which is] always strictly construed against the insurer and in favor of the 
insured.”  Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cosenza, 258 F.3d 197, 206-07 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(citing Erie Ins. Exch. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 533 A.2d 1363, 1366-67 (Pa. 1987)).  
Exclusions are not read in isolation, however; all of the terms of an insurance policy 
“must be read together and construed according to the plain meaning of the words 
involved . . . .”  Estate of Sanchez v. Colonial Penn Ins., 532 A.2d 857, 860 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1987); see Sloan & Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 07-5325, 2008 WL 3832519, at 
*2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 2008) (contractual terms should be “read[ ] in harmony with the 




PNC asserts that the policy at issue here is ambiguous.  It posits that there are two 
interpretations of the Professional Services Charge Exception that are reasonable: (1) the 
Magistrate Judge’s interpretation that the Exception only applies to first-party losses; and 
(2) PNC’s interpretation that the Exception only applies where there has been a “final 
adjudication” that it was not entitled to the overdraft fees paid by its customers.  In light 
of these two reasonable constructions of the Professional Services Charge Exception, 
PNC argues, the Exception is ambiguous and should have been construed in favor of 
coverage.  We are unpersuaded and find that neither of these constructions is reasonable.     
A contractual provision is ambiguous where “it is reasonably susceptible of 
different constructions and capable of being understood in more than one sense.”  
Gardner, 544 F.3d at 558 (quoting Hutchison v. Sunbeam Coal Corp., 519 A.2d 385, 390 
(Pa. 1986)).  Courts should not, however, “distort the meaning of the language or resort 
to a strained contrivance in order to find an ambiguity.”  Madison Const. Co. v. 
Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 735 A.2d 100, 106 (Pa. 1999); see also Selko v. Home Ins. 
Co., 139 F.3d 146, 152 n.3 (3d Cir. 1998) (applying Pennsylvania law).  “Disagreement 
between the parties over the proper interpretation of a contract does not necessarily mean 
that a contract is ambiguous.”  Viera v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 642 F.3d 407, 419 (3d Cir. 
2011) (applying Pennsylvania law) (quoting 12th St. Gym, Inc. v. Gen. Star Indem. Co., 
93 F.3d 1158, 1160 (3d Cir. 1996)).  Moreover, the fact that an insurance policy “has 
been construed in different ways by the various courts that have considered it” does not 
mandate that the policy is ambiguous.  Lower Paxton Twp. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 557 
A.2d 393, 400 n.4 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989). 
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The Magistrate Judge held that the Professional Services Charge Exception only 
applies to first-party losses because applying it to third-party losses would render the PPE 
“superfluous” and coverage under the policy “illusory.”  (J.A. 27.)  The PPE, however, is 
much broader than the Professional Services Charge Exception, as the Professional 
Services Charge Exception only applies to Damages relating to fees or charges for 
Professional Services.  In contrast, the PPE excludes coverage for Damages and Claims 
Expenses relating to any profit or remuneration.8  Therefore, the broader PPE would not 
be rendered superfluous if the Professional Services Charge Exception were applied to 
third-party losses.  Moreover, coverage under the policy would not be illusory because 
the policy would still provide coverage for judgments, awards, surcharges, and 
settlements that do not fall within any of the exceptions to Damages, as well as all Claims 
                                              
8 The primary differences between the Professional Services Charge Exception 
and the PPE are as follows: (1) the Professional Services Charge Exception applies where 
a judgment, award, surcharge, or settlement is reached as a result of a claim regarding 
fees for professional services, (J.A. 115), while the PPE excludes coverage not only 
where the claim involves unlawful profits, but where a claim is “brought about or 
contributed to in fact” by any unlawful gain, (J.A. 118); (2) the Professional Services 
Charge Exception excludes coverage for damages (but not the other type of loss, claims 
expenses, which include the insured’s own legal fees, see (J.A. 51, 114)), while the PPE 
excludes coverage for loss (which includes both damages and claims expenses); (3) the 
Professional Services Charge Exception applies narrowly to “fees . . . for Professional 
Services,” regardless of whether PNC is legally entitled to them, (J.A. 115), while the 
PPE excludes “any . . . profit or remuneration gained by any Insured to which such 
Insured is not legally entitled,” (J.A. 118); and (4) the Professional Services Charge 
Exception is contained within the damages definition that expressly refers to settlement, 
(J.A. 115), while the PPE requires a determination that the Insured is not “legally 
entitled” to such profits or remuneration by a “final adjudication in the underlying 
action.”  (J.A. 118.) 
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Expenses where the PPE or another exclusion is not implicated.9  See ACE Capital Ltd. v. 
Morgan Waldon Ins. Mgmt., LLC, 832 F. Supp. 2d 554, 572 (W.D. Pa. 2011) (applying 
Pennsylvania law) (holding that an insurance policy is only illusory where it “would not 
pay benefits under any reasonably expected set of circumstances” and “is not illusory 
simply because of a potentially wide exclusion” (internal quotations omitted)).  
Accordingly, applying the Professional Services Charge Exception to third-party losses 
does not render the PPE superfluous or coverage illusory, and nothing in the policy’s 
language indicates that the parties intended the Professional Services Charge Exception 
to apply only to first-party losses.  
PNC’s construction of the Professional Services Charge Exception is equally 
meritless.  PNC construes the Professional Services Charge Exception to apply only 
when there is a “final adjudication” mandating the return of fees for Professional 
Services.  But this construction is built on the faulty premise that the PPE and the 
Professional Services Charge Exception “speak to the same subject” and, therefore, the 
PPE’s final adjudication requirement should reasonably apply to the Professional 
Services Charge Exception as well.  (PNC Br. 27.)  As explained above, however, the 
PPE and the Professional Services Charge Exception do not “speak to the same subject” 
because the PPE is much broader than the Professional Services Charge Exception.  If the 
parties intended a final adjudication requirement for the Professional Services Charge 
                                              
9 For example, the policy would still provide coverage for Damages resulting from 
a failure to competently provide Professional Services—such as lawsuits alleging PNC 
failed to offer proper advice, failed to warn of known consequences, or conducted 




Exception to apply, they could have expressly stated so, as they did with the PPE.  We 
find that the plain terms of the Professional Services Charge Exception, however, do not 
require a final adjudication in order for it to apply.10    
In sum, the Magistrate Judge’s and PNC’s constructions of the Professional 
Services Charge Exception are not reasonable.  Rather, each construction “distort[s] the 
meaning of the language or resort[s] to a strained contrivance in order to find an 
ambiguity.”  Madison Const. Co., 735 A.2d at 106.  Accordingly, we find that the 
Professional Services Charge Exception is not ambiguous and the District Court did not 
err by failing to adopt a construction favoring coverage.  
C.  
PNC next argues that the District Court erred by rewriting the Professional 
Services Charge Exception.  See Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Zerance, 479 A.2d 949, 
953 (Pa. 1984) (holding that a court “may not rewrite the insurance contract, under the 
guise of judicial interpretation”).  PNC contends that the Professional Services Charge 
                                              
10 We also reject PNC’s contention that the failure to apply the PPE’s “final 
adjudication” language to the Professional Services Charge Exception creates an 
irreconcilable conflict between the Professional Services Charge Exception and the PPE 
where there is a claim involving charges for Professional Services to which PNC is 
allegedly not legally entitled.  PNC contends that under the District Court’s construction, 
the overdraft fees would qualify as “fees . . . for Professional Services,” (J.A. 115), under 
the Professional Services Charge Exception and as “profit or remuneration . . . to which 
[PNC] is not legally entitled,” (J.A. 118), under the PPE.  According to PNC, this creates 
a conflict between the provisions because one provision requires a final adjudication and 
one does not.  PNC’s argument is flawed, however, because the PPE applies to “Loss,” 
which is defined as “Damages and Claims Expenses.”  Excepted from the definition of 
Damages are “fees, commissions or charges for Professional Services paid or payable to 
[PNC].”  (J.A. 115.)  Therefore, if the Professional Services Charge Exception applies to 
overdraft fees, they are not Damages and do not fall within the definition of Loss, 
rendering the PPE inapplicable. 
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Exception as written provides that “Damages shall not include . . .  fees, commissions, or 
charges for Professional Services paid or payable to an Insured,” but the District Court 
rewrote the Professional Services Charge Exception to exclude the “reimbursement or 
refund . . . to class members of fees for Professional Services originally paid or payable 
to an Insured.”  (PNC Br. 37.)  According to PNC, it was error for the District Court to 
read the words “reimbursement or refund” into the Professional Services Charge 
Exception and to rewrite the phrase “paid or payable to an Insured” to specify to whom 
the fees were originally paid, when the phrase is more reasonably read to specify to 
whom the Damages at issue are paid.  
We reject both of these assertions.  First, the District Court did not graft the words 
“reimbursement” and “refund” onto the Professional Services Charge Exception.  It used 
these words because they are factually accurate descriptions of the settlement payments 
made by PNC.  See (J.A. 693 (explaining the process of submitting a claim “[i]n order to 
receive a refund under [the Trombley Revised] Settlement Agreement”) (emphasis 
added));  (J.A. 752 (“Pursuant to the [Trombley] Revised Settlement Agreement, class 
members would receive a maximum reimbursement of $36 for each eligible overdraft 
charge[d] . . . .”) (emphasis added)); (J.A. 830–33 (agreeing that payments to MDL class 
members would be based upon the number of overdraft fees charged due to high-to-low 
posting minus any overdraft fees already returned or refunded)).  Second, PNC’s 
argument regarding the phrase “paid or payable to an Insured” is a variation of the first-
party construction we rejected above and is contrary to the plain terms of the policy.  
16 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court did not impermissibly rewrite the 
Professional Services Charge Exception in construing the policy’s coverage.  
D.  
Finally, PNC argues that even accepting the District Court’s interpretation of the 
Professional Services Charge Exception, the settlement payments are nonetheless covered 
under the policy because they do not constitute a refund of fees for Professional Services.  
PNC contends that characterizing the class action lawsuits as disputes solely over 
overdraft fees is too narrow of a view because the actions extended more broadly to the 
services PNC provided.  Moreover, the class actions sought more than restitution of fees, 
including compensatory damages, punitive damages, and injunctive relief.  The 
settlement payments were not simply reimbursements, PNC argues, but rather took into 
account a multitude of factors, such as litigation risk.  In rejecting this argument, the 
District Court explained: 
The Court finds that while the Plaintiffs in both Trombley and 
the MDL brought several different types of claims, and 
sought relief in several different forms, the essence of the 
claims dealt with PNC’s policy of charging overdraft fees.  
Moreover, contrary to PNC’s assertion that the settlement 
constituted “compensatory” relief rather than “restitution,” it 
is clear that both settlement agreements were drafted to 
reimburse or refund class members with the overdraft fees 
that the class members had previously paid to PNC.  As such, 
the Court finds that there is no other way for the Court to 
construe the Fee Exception than to encompass the settlements 
at issue here. 
(J.A. 37 (footnote omitted)). 
17 
 
We concur with the District Court’s analysis.11  In both settlement agreements, the 
class members were defined as those who had incurred overdraft fees that had not been 
previously refunded.  See (J.A. 683 (defining Trombley class as “persons who . . . 
incurred at least one Overdraft Fee . . . that was not previously reversed, refunded, or 
returned to the Settlement Class Member by Defendant”)); (J.A. 813 (defining MDL class 
as “[a]ll holders of a PNC Account who . . . incurred one or more Overdraft Fees as a 
result of PNC’s High-to-Low Posting”)).  Likewise, the payouts to class members were 
expressly based upon the number of overdraft fees incurred.  See (J.A. 693 (“A 
Settlement Class Member shall be eligible to claim compensation for each Overdraft Fee 
that the Settlement Class Member incurred during any two calendar months during the 
Class Period.”)); (J.A. 830–33 (explaining that the payouts to class members in the MDL 
settlement would be based on the amount of the class members’ “Positive Differential 
Overdraft Fee”—the excess fees charged by using high-to-low posting as opposed to 
chronological posting.)).  Finally, the notice to class members in each settlement 
explained that payment was based on the amount of overdraft fees charged to each class 
member.  See (J.A. 718 (“Payments will be based upon the number of Overdraft Fees . . . 
.”)); (J.A. 1103 (“Any payment you are eligible to receive will be based on the number of 
overdraft fees charged to your PNC consumer deposit account as a result of posting debit 
card transactions high to low . . . .”)). 
                                              
11 Additionally, we reject PNC’s assertion that this Court cannot decide on this 
record whether the settlement payments constituted fees.  In PNC’s motion for judgment 
on the pleadings, PNC expressly requested that the Court resolve whether the amounts 




Because the Professional Services Charge Exception unambiguously excludes 
from the definition of Damages third-party losses that constitute fees or charges for 
Professional Services paid to PNC and National City Bank, and the MDL and Trombley 
settlement payments in fact refunded overdraft fees, we conclude, as did the District 
Court, “that there is no other way for the Court to construe the [Professional Services 
Charge] Exception than to encompass the settlements at issue here.”  (J.A. 37.) 
E.  
We depart, however, from the District Court’s conclusion that the approximately 
$30 million awarded to class counsel as attorneys’ fees and costs does not fall within the 
Professional Services Charge Exception.  Rather, we hold that the entire $102 million in 
settlement funds are excluded from coverage under the Professional Services Charge 
Exception.   
The District Court held that the amount awarded to class counsel for attorneys’ 
fees and costs fell within the definition of Damages, which includes an “award of . . . 
attorneys’ fees and costs.”  (J.A. 115.)  Concluding that the approximately $30 million 
represented PNC’s payment of class counsels’ attorneys’ fees, and not a refund of fees or 
charges for Professional Services, the District Court held that it did not fall within the 
Professional Services Charge Exception to Damages.   
The policy covers “Loss” —and thus attorneys’ fees—that PNC was “legally 
obligated to pay.”  (J.A. 113.)  Although the settlement agreements contemplated that 
some attorneys’ fees would likely be paid to class counsel, PNC was not legally obligated 
to pay those fees under the terms of the settlement agreements.  Instead, the settlement 
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agreements expressly provided that any attorneys’ fees and costs that were ultimately 
awarded to class counsel would be paid by the class out of the settlement funds.  See (J.A. 
684 (“All attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses will be paid from the Settlement Fund.”)); 
(J.A. 846 (“Any award of attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses to Class Counsel shall be 
payable solely out of the Settlement Fund.”)).  The District Courts awarded counsel fees 
pursuant to the “common fund” or “common benefit” doctrine.  (J.A. 789–92 (explaining 
in the Trombley action that attorneys’ fees will be awarded pursuant to the common fund 
doctrine)); (J.A. 1178–79 (explaining in the MDL action that attorneys’ fees will be 
awarded pursuant to the common benefit doctrine)).  Under the common fund or benefit 
doctrine, “the plaintiff class as a whole rather than the defendant bears the burden of 
attorney’s fees.”  Brytus v. Spang & Co., 203 F.3d 238, 242 (3d Cir. 2000); see In re Diet 
Drugs, 582 F.3d 524, 540 (3d Cir. 2009) (explaining that a “plaintiff’s attorney, whose 
efforts create, discover, increase, or preserve a fund to which others also have a claim, is 
entitled to recover from the fund the costs of his litigation, including attorneys’ fees” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
Here, PNC did not agree to pay a specific sum to settle the claims related to 
overdraft fees and additionally pay the attorneys’ fees ultimately awarded to class 
counsel.12  Instead, PNC and the class plaintiffs agreed that PNC would pay a lump sum 
to the class in order to settle their claims and that PNC would have no further obligation 
                                              
12 PNC and class plaintiffs did make such an agreement regarding notice and 
claims administration costs.  See (J.A. 751–52, 1160.)  Therefore, PNC became legally 





once it paid the lump sum.  That some money from each common fund was subsequently 
paid to counsel upon order of the respective courts does not change the purpose of the 
funds—to resolve the class members’ claims for wrongly collected overdraft fees.  
Notably, the settlement agreements expressly provided that PNC’s obligation remained 
the same regardless of how much in attorneys’ fees, if any, the District Courts eventually 
awarded.  Once the District Courts decided to award counsel fees, the parties agreed that 
the awarded fees and costs would be paid by “the plaintiff class as a whole rather than the 
defendant.”  See Brytus, 203 F.3d at 242; see In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 404 F.3d 
173, 187 (3d Cir. 2005) (explaining that a court acts as a “fiduciary” for a class to ensure 
that an appropriate portion of the class's funds are used to pay counsel).  
Therefore, we conclude that the approximately $30 million awarded to class 
counsel as attorneys’ fees and costs do not constitute an award of attorneys’ fee and costs 
that PNC was legally obligated to pay.  Rather, PNC was legally obligated to pay $102 
million to reimburse class members for charged overdraft fees, from which the class 
plaintiffs—not PNC—paid their attorneys approximately $30 million for their services.  
Accordingly, the entire $102 million in settlement payments constitutes a refund of fees 
or charges for Professional Services that class members paid to PNC and National City 
Bank, and as such, are excluded from coverage pursuant to the Professional Services 




For all the foregoing reasons, we will affirm in part and reverse in part the District 
Court’s judgment and remand the case to the District Court for the entry of an appropriate 
order. 
